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CPYRGHT There Are Other Ossenkos

Whether or not Yuri Ivanovich Ossenko, Russian secret police staff officer who has sought asylum in the U.S., knows secrets of Soviet nuclear weapons production, as some Western sources speculate, his defection is a hard blow to Red intelligence.

The idea that he may have information on atomic weapons arises from the fact that Ossenko was serving as security officer for the Red delegation at the Geneva disarmament parley at the time of his defection.

Based on the previous pattern CPYRGHT delegations to conferences in other countries, this meant that Ossenko was a highly trusted agent detailed to keep close rein on the actual members of the delegation to ensure that they neither defected nor gave away any secrets. To remain as close to the delegates as this necessitated, he could not have failed to overhear a great deal about Soviet capabilities in nuclear warfare.

Even if he has picked up only useless fragments of information in this field, however, Ossenko's defection can be of tremendous help to the West. He is not the first KGB (security-intelligence agency) man to flee Communism; oth-

er notable examples are Igor Gouzenko in Canada, 1947; Nikolay Khokhlov, West Germany, Juri Rastvorov, Japan, Peter Deriabin, Vienna, and Vadimir Petrov, Australia, all in 1954; and Bogdon Stashinski, West Germany, in 1961.

CIA Director Allen Dulles, in his recent book, "The Craft of Intelligence," noted that the principal value of such defectors was that "one such intelligence 'volunteer' can literally paralyze the service he left behind for months to come" because of what he knows and tells of policies, plans, current operations and secret agents.

That Ossenko's value to the U.S. is even greater than simply his knowledge of Soviet nuclear capabilities should be comforting to all citizens of the U.S. It should be especially comforting when weighed against these words also found in Dulles' book:

"Some of the most important . . . defectors have so far chosen not to be 'surfaced' and for their own protection must remain unknown to the public."

In other words, for every Ossenko of whom we learn there may be several more never disclosed—for their own protection and our intelligence security.